The Republic Of Acastus v. The State Of Rubia: The Case Concerning The Elysian Fields by Lau, Zabrina et al.
THE REPUBLIC OF ACASTUS v. THE STATE OF
RUBRIA: THE CASE CONCERNING THE
ELYSIAN FIELDS
Zabrina Lau, Timothy Parker, Kay Seto, Yvonne Shi, and Megan Yeung*
1. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................... 242
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................... 242
III. QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................................... 245
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS ................................... 245
V . PLEADINGS ........................................... 247
A. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over All Claims in This Case,
Since Acastus Has Succeeded to Nessus's Status as a
Party to the Statute of the Court ...................... 247
1. N essus's Status ................................ 247
2. Acastus Has Succeeded Nessus ................... 247
3. This Court Should Not Penalize a Defect in a
Procedural Act which the Applicant Could Easily
Rem edy ..................................... 252
4. This Court Should Rule In Light of The Purpose and
Object of the Statute ........................... 253
B. By Permitting The Construction of the Pipeline as Proposed,
Rubria Would Violate the Rights ofAcastian Citizens of
Elysian Heritage .................................. 253
1. The Construction of the Pipeline as Proposed Violates
Rubria's Obligations under Article 27 of the ICCPR .. 253
2. Rubria's Actions Do Not Constitute a Legitimate
Restriction of Elysians' Rights ................... 256
3. The Sovereignty Rights of Rubria Do Not Absolve It of
Liability for the Alleged Breaches as Rubria's
Sovereignty Rights Are Qualified by the Elysians'
Right of Self-Determination ...................... 257
C. The Activities of PROF in the Elysium, Including the Forced
Labor of Civilians, are Violations of International Law
and are Attributable to Rubria ........................ 260
* Memorial for the Applicant, Hong Kong University, Hong Kong, China; The 2006 Phillip C.
Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition.
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
1. The Activities of PROF in the Elysium, Including
Forced Labor, Are Violations of International Law ... 260
2. COG is Liable for PROF's Activities .............. 261
3. The Activities of PROF in the Elysium Are
Attributable to Rubria .......................... 262
D. The Outcome of the Borius Litigation Does Not Place
Acastus in Breach of Article 52 of the RABBIT ........... 266
1. TNC Is Not Liable for the Conduct of PROF under
AIRES Since It Is Not a Subject of International Law 266
2. TNC Is Not a Proper Party Defendant within the
Meaning of the MCRA ......................... 269
VI. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF ....................... 272
VII. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................... 273
A. Case, Advisory Opinion and Arbitral Decisions.......... 273
B. International Instruments and Conventions ............. 274
C. United Nations Documents .......................... 275
D. Publicists: Books .................................. 276
E. Publicists: Journals ................................ 276
F. National Legislation and Constitutions ................. 277
G. M iscellaneous .................................... 278
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Acastus and the State of Rubria have agreed to submit the
present controversy for final resolution by the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") by Special Agreement pursuant to Article 40, Paragraph 1 of the Statute
of this Court.' In accordance with Article 36,2 the jurisdiction of the Court
comprises all cases that the parties refer to it.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
This dispute arises out of the responsibilities over alleged human rights
violations committed in the Elysian Fields. The Elysium, inhabited by a
community of approximately 5,000 indigenous Elysians, is a territory that runs
through the border between the Republic of Acastus (Applicant) and the State
of Rubria (Respondent). The residential villages of the Elysians are located
north of the border in Acastus. The Elysians depend completely upon the fertile
agricultural lands located south of Rubria for food. The Elysium has retained
its unique prehistoric cultural heritage, with its own language and religion. Its
economy is wholly agricultural. Their agricultural lands are stewarded by the
1. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 40.
2. Id. at art. 36.
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National Park Authority, an agency of the Rubrian government. An under-
ground spring, situated fifty kilometers south of the Elysium, irrigates the entire
agricultural land.
Up until this dispute, relations between Acastus and Rubria were friendly
since their independence from the former Republic of Nessus which was
dissolved in 2000. For several decades predating their independence, there was
disagreement between the political factions in the north and south. With
Nessus dissolved, the North then became Acastus and the South Rubria. The
600-kilometer border between Acastus and Rubria runs exactly along the 36th
parallel.
The capital of Nessus, sitting in the North, is now the capital of Acastus.
Acastus has continued the trade and industrial activities that distinguishably
characterized the North before independence. Acastus granted the Elysians all
rights of citizenship, and a seat in the Acastus Parliament reserved for the
Elysians has been occupied by Mrs. Doris Galatea since 2002.
Notwithstanding Rubria's application for United Nations ("UN")
membership in April 2001, Acastus sent a note to the UN Secretary-General at
the same time, submitting Acastus's continuation of Nessus's membership in
the UN, of all the UN organs including the ICJ, and all other treaties for which
the UN serves as depository. Nessus was an original member of the UN and a
party to several other treaties. Following the Under-Secretary-General for
Legal Affairs' memorandum interpreting Resolution 2386 at the request of the
Secretary-General, Acastus was allowed to temporarily continue the member-
ship of Nessus in the UN. Acastus maintained the entire diplomatic core at the
UN and its organs, including sitting behind nameplates reading "Acastus" and
flying the flag of Acastus in place of the flag of Nessus. Furthermore, Acastus
has assumed obligations under Nessus's multi-year plan to repay its 1999 dues.
Aiming to enhance foreign investment opportunities, the Acastus
Parliament passed the "Multinational Corporate Responsibility Act" ("MCRA")
in December 2002. The Act aims to ensure Acastus's business entities hold
themselves to the same standards in both domestic and overseas affairs and
thereby to encourage other states to enter into bilateral investment treaties
("BITs") with Acastus. There have been several BITs entered between Acastus
and other states before Rubria and Acastus signed the Rubria-Acastus Binding
Bilateral Investment Treaty ("RABBIT") in February 2003. The RABBIT not
only contained provisions on investment, but also procedures for dispute
resolution including reference to the ICJ. Acastus joined the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") on January 1, 2003.
Following the discovery of rich oil deposits on the Rubrian side of the
Elysium by geologists of Trans-National Corporation ("TNC"), a privately-
owned limited liability company incorporated in Acastus, TNC entered into an
agreement with the government of Rubria to form Corporation for Oil & Gas
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("COG"), a joint-venture corporation incorporated in Rubria in May 2003.
COG's aim is to develop and export petroleum resources discovered in the
Elysium. TNC and the government of Rubria remain the two sole shareholders
of COG. COG was granted exclusive operational rights in the region by the
President of Rubria, Mr. Leon Fides.
In June 2004, despite reviewing alternative plans to extract and export the
deposits for ten months, COG accepted a proposal that would lead to the
destruction of over half of the Elysians' agricultural lands and would block the
spring which the Elysians depend. The detrimental repercussions envisaged by
the proposed construction of the pipeline were later confirmed by the Institute
of Local Studies and Appraisals ("ILSA"), an internationally respected non-
governmental organization ("NGO"). The ILSA observed that the Elysians
were left with virtually no choice as it was unthinkably difficult for them to
adapt to the lifestyles in the cities of Acastus and Rubria. After the proposal
was made public, the Rubrian government did not raise any criticisms and
thereby permitted the construction.
Fully aware of the harm posed, COG authorized and financed the creation
of Protection & Retention Operations Force ("PROF") to guard their personnel,
anticipating possible hostility from the Elysians. COG is the only client of
PROF, paying a fee that covered almost all of the expenses incurred by PROF.
COG further provided PROF with all necessary equipment to carry out their
duties. PROF mainly consisted of former members and recently retired
commanders of the Rubrian armed forces. The ILSA expert team found that
PROF had inter alia seized young Elysian men to work for COG by waving
weapons at them and forcing them to work under inhumane working conditions
and perform dangerous work without compensation.
On September 30, 2004, Mr. Davide Borius, one of the men seized,
brought an action against COG, PROF, Rubria, and TNC in an Acastus civil
court, with the help of Mrs. Galatea and several NGOs. The plaintiffs
submitted that the court had jurisdiction over the case against COG, PROF, and
Rubria in accordance with the Acastian International Rights Enforcement
Statute ("AIRES").
On November 8, 2004, the court dismissed the claim against TNC on the
ground that it was not directly involved in the alleged violations and COG's
corporate veil could not be pierced. PROF was also dismissed as a defendant
because it did not conduct business nor have assets in Acastus and thus was not
"present" there under the terms of AIRES.
Unlike TNC, Rubria is a direct alleged violator and the situs of the alleged
violations. Further, Rubria was not immune from suit under Acastus's foreign
sovereign immunity statute because of the commercial nature of Rubria's
activities. The court retained Rubria as a defendant on November 10, 2004.
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Although COG did not appear at any stage of the proceedings, the nature
of its business was such as to come within the meaning of "present" under the
AIRES. On January 15, 2005, the court found the two remaining defendants
jointly liable to the plaintiffs, with compensatory damages amounting to 200
million Euros.
The Elysians have exhausted all local remedies available in Rubria to
rectify the problems stipulated in the Compromis.
Noting Rubria's disagreement over the judgment, Acastus notified the
Ministry of Justice of Rubria that Acastus intended to institute proceedings
before the ICJ. Further noting Rubria's preliminary objection to the admissi-
bility of the case, Acastus withdrew its application and started negotiations with
Rubria. Thereafter, the construction was suspended while Acastus refrains
from enforcing the Borius judgment against Rubria and COG.
On September 15, 2005, Acastus and Rubria jointly submitted the
Compromis, agreeing to the stipulated facts of the dispute notwithstanding a
disagreement on the Court's adhocjurisdiction. The Court has decided to hear
arguments relating to jurisdiction and the merits of the case concurrently.
III. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Acastus requests that the Court adjudge and declare that:
A) the Court has jurisdiction over all claims in this case, since
Acastus has succeeded to Nessus's status as a party to the
Statute of the Court;
B) by permitting the construction of the pipeline as proposed,
Rubria would violate the rights of Acastus's citizens of Elysian
heritage;
C) the activities of PROF in the Elysium, including the forced labor
of civilians, are attributable to Rubria and are violations of
international law; and
D) the outcome of the Borius litigation does not place Acastus in
breach of Article 52 of the RABBIT.
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
This Court has jurisdiction over all claims in this case, since Acastus has
succeeded to Nessus's status as a party to the Statute of the Court. Acastus's
succession of Nessus is evident from the presence of both "objective" and
"subjective" factors. "Objective" factors include Acastus retaining Nessus's
capital city as its capital city; sustaining Nessus's former economic relations;
maintaining Nessus's diplomatic relations, within or outside the UN structure;
and assuming Nessus's multi-year plan to repay outstanding dues. "Subjective"
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factors are usually regarded as more important. Recognition of Acastus as the
successor of Nessus by third states and Acastus's consistent self-conception of
its succession have convincingly shown Acastus's succession to Nessus's
status. Acastus's succession to Nessus's membership in the UN is also consis-
tent with the general trend and practice of state succession laid down by former
key state dissolutions, most notably in the case of British India, USSR, and
SFRY.
The construction of the pipeline as planned will render it impossible for
the Elysians to continue their traditional way of life. This state of affairs will
see them deprived of their rights under Article 27 of the ICCPR.3 By failing to
provide adequate legal protection for these rights, the State of Rubria is in
breach of its obligations under Article 2(2) of the Covenant.4 The restriction
on the Elysians' rights was neither necessary nor prescribed by law, and so
cannot constitute a lawful restriction under the ICCPR. As a matter of
customary international law, the Elysian people, as indigenous occupiers, have
special ownership/usage rights in the Elysian Fields and the natural resources
pertaining thereto. These rights qualify the sovereign rights of Rubria over the
land and its resources. This qualification prevents Rubria from maintaining the
defense that its acts were the lawful exercise of its sovereign rights.
The activities of PROF violated the Elysian labourers' right to liberty and
security, the right to fair and just remuneration for work, and the right to their
own means of subsistence. PROF was also in violation of international treaties
and custom which prohibit any form of forced labor.
COG is liable for PROF's illegal conduct since PROF is COG's
empowered agent. Rubria is directly responsible for PROF's conduct due to its
interest in and control of COG. Despite its status as the minority shareholder,
Rubria had effective control over COG by way of its economic, legal and
political connection with the corporation. Furthermore or alternatively, Rubria
has an implied duty under the ICCPR, the ICSECR, ILO Conventions, and
international custom to regulate the conduct of multi-national corporations
within its jurisdiction to ensure the non-violation of human rights and other
international commitments. Rubria has failed to discharge its duty to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the Elysians' rights.
The AIRES is concerned with claims under international law. As the
primary rules of international law are addressed to states and state officials,
TNC, as a non-state actor, is not a subject of international law. Currently, there
is no binding agreement that directly imposes international obligations or duties
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, G.A. Resolution 2200A (XXi),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
4. Id. at art. 2(2).
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on corporations. TNC is also not bound by any "soft law" which seeks to
impose international obligations directly on corporations.
Furthermore, TNC is not a proper party defendant within the meaning of
the MCRA since it had no direct involvement in the activities of PROF in the
Elysium. Despite the express incorporation of the OECD Guidelines, the
MCRA does not repeal the principle of limited liability and hence TNC is
protected by its separate legal status from that of COG. The approach of the
Acastian court is in concert with decisions of other national courts.
V. PLEADINGS
A. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over All Claims in This Case, Since Acastus
Has Succeeded to Nessus's Status as a Party to the Statute of the Court.
1. Nessus's Status
Nessus was a founding member of the UN and was a party to the Statute
of the ICJ. Nessus accepted the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction in all cases. In
2000, Nessus was dissolved and its territory was divided into Acastus and
Rubria. Article 93(1) of the UN Charter provides that membership of the UN
gives rise ipsofacto to the presumption that it is a party to the Statute.5 Acastus
submits that the ICJ maintains its compulsoryjurisdiction in all claims by virtue
of having succeeded Nessus's membership in the UN and party status to the
Statute.
2. Acastus Has Succeeded Nessus.
Scholars have noted that the law of state succession remains uncertain, and
consistent state practice to establish an international custom is lacking.6 In the
absence of settled legal rules, this Court will want to consider all the relevant
circumstances as a whole in this case when determining the status of Acastus.
The circumstances to be considered may be grouped into "objective" and
"subjective" factors. "Objective" factors are the variants of the basic criteria
for statehood, such as retention of a certain amount of the former state's popula-
tion, armed forces or seat of government,7 while "subjective" factors include the
state's claim to continuity and its self-conception and, "most importantly, the
international recognition of, or acquiescence in, this claim by third states."8
5. U.N. Charter art. 93, para. 1.
6. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 650 (5th ed. 1998).
7. KONRAD G. BUHLER, STATE SUCCESSION AND MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
18(2001).
8. Rein Mullerson, The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the Former USSR
and Yugoslavia, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 473, 476 (1993).
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The classification provides not only clarity, but also possibly a "formula" or
doctrine that could be applied in future cases. The subjective factors are
"particularly important in doubtful or marginal cases."9
a. "Objective" Factors Are Present.
i. The General Rule is That "Objective," Factors Alone are Not Conclusive of
Whether a New State Has Succeeded the Former State's Status.
The International Law Association has summarized in the 1996 Helsinki
Conference that, inter alia, the name of the state and its capital; (minor)
territorial change; changes of the population; changes of governmental or state
power and constitutional change; and (temporary) occupation bellica do not
affect the identity and continuity of a state."
ii. Acastus's Capital City was the Former Capital City of Nessus. Acastus
Has Sustained Nessus's Former Economic Relations and Industries.
The circumstances are consistent with the theory of "core or nucleus" of
territory coined famously by Hall who wrote: "identity of a state therefore is
considered to subsist so long as a part of the territory which can be recognised
as the essential portion through the preservation of the capital or of the original
territorial nucleus ......
iii. Acastus Has Satisfied the Essential Requirements for Membership in the
UN as Laid Down in Article 4 of the UN Charter.
Article 4 of the UN Charter states that UN membership is open to all
"peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained."' 2 Acastus is a
peace-loving state as evident by instituting the present proceedings before the
ICJ and refraining from enforcing the Borius judgment. Acastus has willingly
accepted the obligations as a UN member by inter alia, assuming annual
obligations under Nessus's multi-year plan to repay its 1999 dues and
continuing to participate in the UN and its agencies since Nessus's dissolution
in 2000. Acastus's bonafide involvement in the UN is being recognized by the
UN community evidenced by Acastus's delegation sitting behind "Acastus"
nameplates in the UN and its agencies since 2000 and the flag of Acastus flown
in place of the flag of Nessus.
9. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 402 (1979).
10. BUHLER, supra note 7, at 14 (citing Report of the Sixty Seventh Conference held at Helsinki,
Finland, (1996) Int'l Law Ass'n).
11. WILLIAM HALL & A. PEARCE HIGGINS, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (1917).
12. U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 4.
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b. "Subjective" Factors Are Present.
i. Acastus is Recognized as the Successor of Nessus.
"Where there are substantial changes in the entity concerned, continuity
may depend upon recognition (as in the case of India after 1947)."'" There
were no major objections to the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs'
memorandum interpreting Resolution 2386. Acastus can distinguish itself from
the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
("SFRY") where UN members held different views resulting in different
resolutions being adopted.' 4 In addition, several third-party states that had
bilateral treaties with Nessus have considered those treaties as continuing as
between them and Acastus."5
ii. Acastus's Self Conception on its Succession of Nessus Has Been
Consistent. The "Behaviour of the State Itself' is Important in Determining
its Status.'
6
c. There is a Presumption of Continuance of the State.
There is a "presumption [of continuity]-in practice a strong one-[lies]
in favour of the continuance, and against the extinction of an established
State."' 7 The international legal order is generally favorable to stability in
international relations and the preservation of the status quo. The strong
presumption of continuance of state should favour Acastus's continuance of
Nessus's membership in the UN and Nessus's status as party to the Statute.
d. Acastus's Succession to Nessus's Membership is Consistent with the
General Trend and Practice of State Succession Laid Down by Former Key
State Dissolutions.
i. Example from India's Succession to British India's
Membership of the UN.
The partition of British India into Dominions of India and Pakistan in
1947, occurring simultaneously with the former's attainment of independence,
13. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 406.
14. Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership in the United
Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29, 55-63 (1995).
15. Compromis, 8.
16. Rein Mullerson, New Developments in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 33 VA. J. INT'L L.
199, 303 (1993).
17. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 417.
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was the first instance in which the UN was faced with the problems of
succession to membership.'" As contended by Professor Crawford, recognition
of India's continuity by third states seems to have been of decisive signifi-
cance.' 9 Likewise, Acastus has been recognized by the majority of the UN
member states. In considering the legal question of succession, the Sixth
(Legal) Committee adopted several guidelines as general guidance for future
cases.20 They are, inter alia, (1) constitutional or territorial changes are pre-
sumed not to affect UN membership unless the extinction of a state as a legal
personality recognised in the international order is shown; and (2) each case
must be considered according to its merits and its particular circumstances.2'
Acastus has sustained Nessus's legal personality by evidence of continuance of
Nessus's conventional obligations and diplomatic relations with third states.
The merits of this case, as highlighted by both "objective" and "subjective"
factors listed above, call for a strong inclination towards the conclusion that
Acastus's succession has properly succeeded Nessus.
ii. Example from the Russian Federation's Succession to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic's ("USSR") Membership of the UN.
With the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Russian President Yeltsin sent
a letter to the UN Secretary-General, declaring Russia would "continue" the
membership of the USSR in the UN and requested that the UN replace the name
"the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" with the name "Russian Federa-
tion. 22 Shortly after, Russia took over the seat of the USSR in all UN organs,
including its permanent seat in the Security Council. 23 Russia had not been
subjected to any formal admission procedures.24 In this context, Acastus's
declaration of its succession of Nessus's status and the subsequent positive
reactions from the international community towards Acastus's succession
should be accepted as clear and sufficient evidence that Acastus has succeeded
Nessus's status as a party to the Statute.
18. Scharf, supra note 14, at 34; see Oscar Schachter, The Development of International Law
Through the Legal Opinions of the United Nations Secretariat, 1948 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 91, 101.
19. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 402.
20. Scharf, supra note 14, at 35; see U.N. GAOR, 1 st Comm., Annex 14g, at 582-83, U.N. Doc.
A/C. 1/212 (1947) (letter from Chairman of the Sixth Committee to the Chairman of the First Committee).
21. Scharf, supra note 14, at35-36;seeU.N. GAOR, lstComm., Annex 14g, at 582-83, U.N. Doc.
A/C. 1/212 (1947) (letter from Chairman of the Sixth Committee to the Chairman of the First Committee).
22. Scharf, supra note 14, at 46; see Letter from Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Soviet
Socialist Republic, to Javier Peres de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Dec. 24, 1991), U.N.
Doc. 1991/RUSSIA (1991) [hereinafter Yeltsin U.N. Letter] (on file with author).
23. Scharf, supra note 14, at 47.
24. Id.
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iii. Example from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's ("FRY")
Succession to the SFRY's Membership of the UN.
FRY's succession to the SFRY's membership of the UN has been by far
the most complicated precedent because both the "objective" and "subjective"
factors present in the FRY case had not been compelling enough to denote a
clear conclusion as to whether FRY was a successor of the SFRY" With
respect to the "objective" factors, even though FRY retained the former capital
Belgrade and the whole governmental machinery, it comprises only about forty
percent of the territory and forty-five percent of the population of the former
SFRY;26 whereas for the "subjective" factors, FRY's claim to "continue the
state, international legal and political personality of the [SFRY] '' 27 was
vigorously debated and many third states had expressed doubts as to whether
FRY was entitled to take over the SFRY's membership in the UN. It was
evident from FRY's later suspension to participate in the work of the General
Assembly that the disagreement existed.28 Nonetheless, FRY was regarded as
the continuation of the SFRY by this Court.29 The international reaction
experienced by Acastus was much more positive and as such, the acts of the
international community are persuasive and clearly determinative of Acastus's
succession of Nessus's status.
In the Bosnia case,jurisdiction rationepersonae was established following
the FRY's declaration regarding the continuation of the SFRY's membership.3"
Jurisdiction was established upon the intention expressed by the FRY to remain
bound by the international treaties to which the SFRY was party.31 Acastus's
note to the UN Secretary-General in April 2001, declaring continuation of
Nessus's membership should be given the same effect as the FRY's declaration.
Following the legal confusion caused by GA Resolution 47/1 regarding
FRY's status, the Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel of the UN had
25. YehudaZ. Blum, Membership ofthe "New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 830, 833 (1992).
26. Id. at 833.
27. The Ambassador, Letter Dated2 7April 1992from the ChargeD 'Affaires A.L of the Permanent
Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, delivered
to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23877 (May 5, 1992).
28. Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 July 1996 in Application of Convention on
Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 122
31 (July 11) [hereinafter No. 122].
29. Application ofConvention on Prevention and Punishment ofCrime ofGenocide (Bosn. & Herz.
v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (July 11) [hereinafter No. 91].
30. No. 91, 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (July 11).
31. Id.
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provided a legal explanatory statement at the request of Permanent Representa-
tives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia on 29 September 1992.32 It
explained that "the resolution [47/1] neither terminates nor suspends
Yugoslavia's membership in the Organization. 3 3 In the present case, the
Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs' memorandum interpreting Resolu-
tion 2386 had noted that "Nessus has ceased to exist ... the resolution [2386]
does not prevent Acastus from temporarily continuing the membership of
Nessus in the United Nations. '"" However, it did not determine whether
Nessus's membership was terminated or suspended and did not provide a time
frame as to when Acastus's continuation of Nessus's status would lapse.
Therefore, the argument that Acastus has succeeded Nessus's status has always
been valid.
3. This Court Should Not Penalize a Defect in a Procedural Act which the
Applicant Could Easily Remedy.35
"The ICJ, whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to attach to
matters of form the same degree of importance which they might possess in
municipal law."36 Procedural defects such as premature application are not
adequate reasons for the dismissal of the applicant's suit.37 Even if Acastus
were to formally apply for UN membership and waited a year, giving effect to
Rubria's reservation of requiring the opposing party to be a party to the Statute
for more than a year, Acastus's "new" application filed in the ICJ would still
be almost identical to the present one as the current conflict would remain
unsettled. It defies common sense to require Acastus to institute fresh
proceedings upon the compliance with formal UN membership application
procedure.3 8 This Court should maintain its compulsory jurisdiction over all
claims in this case.
32. No. 122, 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 122.
33. Id.
34. Compromis, 10.
35. No. 91, 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (July 11).
36. Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15,28 (Dec. 2) (citing The Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), 1924 P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, 34 (Aug. 30); see also Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 24-25 [hereinafter
Nicaragua].
37. No. 91, 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (July 11).
38. Northern Cameroons, 1963 I.C.J. 15, 28.
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4. This Court Should Rule In Light of The Purpose and
Object of the Statute.
In Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"),
a treaty should be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose.39 The nature
of the treaty is significant to its interpretation.4' The ICJ was established to
encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes, one of the UN's fundamental
goals evidenced by Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter.4' As with many treaties,
it was the intention to involve as many states as possible. This intention is
made clearer if seen in light of the different possible means by which
jurisdiction can be conferred upon the ICJ. Therefore, the Statute aims to
encourage peaceful settlement of disputes between more states. The Elysians
had already exhausted all domestic remedies to rectify the problems and
Acastus respectfully asks this Court to maintain its compulsoryjurisdiction over
all claims in this case so as to provide a peaceful resolution to this potentially
destructive situation involving the lives and livelihood of an ancient people.
B. By Permitting The Construction of the Pipeline as Proposed, Rubria
Would Violate the Rights ofAcastian Citizens of Elysian Heritage.
1. The Construction of the Pipeline as Proposed Violates Rubria's
Obligations under Article 27 of the ICCPR.
Rubria is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"). Article 27 of the ICCPR states that: "In those states in
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own
religion, or to use their own language. 42
The jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee
("UNHRC") on Article 27 has been developed largely through cases brought
to it under the Optional Protocol.43 These cases demonstrate that Article 27 can
form the basis at international law for compelling states to recognize and take
active steps to preserve the "special relationship of indigenous peoples with
39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/viennaconvention.pdf#search=%22article%2031 %20vienna%20conv
ention%22 (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
40. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
41. U.N. Charter, supra note 5, at arts. 1-2.
42. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 27.
43. Look in footnote 43 when ILL comes in
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their land."" As the treaty body has been specifically authorized by sovereign
state parties to administer the treaty, the UNHRC's opinion is of great
persuasive value. In its General Comments, the UNHRC has stated that:
With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under Article
27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in many forms,
including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources,
specially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include such
traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves
protected by law .... .
In Ldnsman v. Finland, the UNHRC affirmed the principle that Article 27
protects traditional practices of indigenous groups and their right to do so on
traditional lands.46 This case concerned the alleged disturbance of reindeer
breeding-which formed part of the Saami custom-by government authorized
quarrying of the Etela-Riutusvaara Mountain.47 While the UNHRC concluded
that, on the facts, the scale of quarrying was not sufficient to illicit the impact
on alleged reindeer breeding, it was noted that a significant expansion of the
quarrying would put Finland in breach of Article 27.' 8 The Committee also
gave significant weight to the fact that the Saami were consulted over the
licensing process. 4
In Ominayak v. Canada, the UNHRC found Canada in breach of its Article
27 obligations as against the indigenous Lubicon Lake Band.5" The facts,
closely analogous to the instant case, were thus: the Band had, since time
immemorial, occupied an area of approximately 10,000 square kilometers of
lake territory in Alberta, Canada.51 They continued to practice their traditional
means of subsistence, namely: hunting, fishing, and trapping. 52 The Provincial
Government of Alberta granted forestry leases, as well as oil and gas
exploration licenses over almost all of the 10,000 square kilometers to various
private corporations." The UNHRC placed considerable emphasis on the fact
44. SARAH PRITCHARD, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 196
(1998).
45. General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities, U.N. CCPR Human Rights Committee,
50th Sess., 1314th Mtg., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.5 (1994).
46. Commc'n No. 511/1992: Finland, Aug. 11, 1994, CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992.
47. Id. 19.6.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Ominayak v. Canada, [1990] Commc'n No. 167/1984, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., A/45/40, vol.
H1, annex IX.A [hereinafter Ominayak].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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that the leasing process was carried out without consultation with or
representation of the Band or its interests." The environmental impact of the
forestry and exploration activities was such that it would prevent the Band from
engaging in its traditional way of life altogether." The UNHRC found that the
Canadian Government's failure to legally protect the Band's traditional way of
life constituted a breach of its Article 27 obligations. 6
Acastus submits that the environmental damage attendant on the
construction of the pipeline would result in the loss of rights of Acastian
citizens of Elysian heritage, which rights are guaranteed under Article 27."
Over half the Elysians' agricultural lands would be directly destroyed by the
construction process.58 The agricultural capacity of the other half would be
destroyed by the blocking of water supplies.59 It will be recalled that "[t]he
Elysians depend completely on the rich agricultural lands located in Rubria for
food."6 According to the ILSA report of September 2004, it will no longer be
possible for the Elysians to subsist on the Elysian Fields, or to practice their
traditional way of life.6  The report concludes: "If the pipeline is built
according to plan, each and every Elysian will have a very simple choice: leave
their ancestral homeland for the inhospitable cities of Acastus and Rubria, or
starve."62 Acastus submits that the ILSA report is evidence of the highest
quality, and should be accepted by this Court. It is further submitted that the
sudden rural-urban migration of the Elysians would do irreparable harm to
customs, language, and religion of the people.63
It is submitted that the deprivation of the Article 27 rights of the Elysians
creates positive obligations against Rubria to enact positive legal measures to
protect their rights. The UNHRC held that this requirement arises pursuant to
Article 2(2) of the ICCPR, which obligates state parties to the Covenant to,
inter alia, "adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."'  These rights arise
irrespective of the fact that the victims are not citizens of Rubria, since Article
54. 1d.
55. Ominayak, [1990] Commc'n No. 167/1984, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., A/45/40, vol. II, annex
IX.A.
56. Id.
57. Compromis, 37.
58. Id. 21.
59. Id
60. Id. 5.
61. Id. 24.
62. Compromis, 24.
63. PRITCHARD, supra note 44.
64. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 2(2).
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2(1) of the ICCPR states that "[T]he rights enunciated in the present Covenant
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to... national or social
origin... ."65 On the facts, Rubria has passed no laws nor instituted any legal
proceedings to protect the Article 27 rights of Acastian citizens of Elysian
heritage. It is therefore submitted that Rubria has violated the rights of these
people.
2. Rubria's Actions Do Not Constitute a Legitimate
Restriction of Elysians' Rights.
Acastus concedes that the rights under ICCPR Article 27 are of such
character that they may properly be subject to restrictions. However, it is
submitted that, in conformity with international human rights practices, such
restrictions must meet two criteria: they must be prescribed by law, and no
greater than are necessary.66
With regard to the first requirement, the European Court of Human Rights
held in Hashman andHarrup v. United Kingdom that the phrase "prescribed by
law" in the context of the restriction on human rights must be taken to mean
"through legislative process."67 Rubria has not enacted any legislative, legal,
or quasi-legal measures purporting to restrict the Elysians' rights under Article
27.
The second requirement is that restriction on rights must be "necessary."68
In the plain sense, the term "necessary" connotes that there must exist some
concern or reason for the restriction that is objectively commensurate to-or
greater than-the importance to the upholding of the right. The UNHRC case
of Kitok v. Sweden laid down a stricter necessity test for the restriction of the
Article 27 rights.69 It is summarized here by the Australian Human Rights and
Equal Opportunities Commission: "[T]o be valid and not breach Article 27, a
restriction upon the right of an individual member of a minority must be shown
to have a reasonable and objective justification and to be necessary for the
continued viability and welfare of the minority as a whole."7
65. Id. at art. 2(1).
66. International Covenant on Economic, Social, & Cultural Rights art. 4, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3(enteredintoforce
Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; ICCPR, supra note 3, arts. 18, 21, 22.
67. Hashman v. U.K., 25594/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 133 (1999).
68. ICESCR, supra note 66, at art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 3, arts. 18, 21, 22.
69. Kitok v. Swed. Commc'n No. 197/1985, U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/33/D/197/85.
70. Id. 9.2; see also The fight against racism: Principles of non-discrimination and equality,
available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/socialjustice/ntissues/fight.html#21 (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
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The reason for the restriction of the Elysians' rights in this case is strictly
financial; other routings for the pipeline could have been pursued by COG but
were dismissed on grounds of cost alone.7 Acastus submits that the monetary
gain by project stakeholders cannot render a restriction of the livelihood rights
and cultural rights as "necessary" in the objective sense. The strict Kitok
necessity demands that the restriction be necessary specifically for the
protection of the right bearers themselves.7" It has not been argued by
Rubria-and such an argument could not stand on the facts-that the restriction
of the Elysians' rights would promote the long-term viability of the Elysians
themselves. It is submitted, therefore, that the restrictions do not meet the
necessity requirement under any formulation.
Based on these submissions, namely that any restriction that has taken
place on the rights of Acastian citizens of Elysian heritage arising from Article
27 of the ICCPR was neither prescribed by law nor necessary, Acastus submits
that any such restrictions cannot be viewed as legitimate in light of Rubria's
international obligations under international law.
3. The Sovereignty Rights of Rubria Do Not Absolve It of Liability for the
Alleged Breaches as Rubria's Sovereignty Rights Are Qualified by the
Elysians' Right of Self-Determination.
Acastus submits that the Elysians have a right to self-determination at
international law. This includes the right to continue to subsist on their
traditional lands, and the right to participate in the management of natural
resources pertaining to those lands as well as a share in any profits derived from
exploitation of those resources.
Nessus acquired its sovereignty over the Elysian Fields through the method
of occupation, as the absence of any war or succession treaty between the
Elysians and Nessus rules out other methods of acquisition. In order to lawfully
acquire territory by occupation, the territory in question must have been, at the
time of occupation, terra nullius-or "territory belonging to no one"-at
international law.73 Until the 20th century, many smaller indigenous societies
that occupied territory were considered too "backwards" and lacking in
sufficient socio-political complexity to be considered occupiers at international
law.
74
71. Compromis, 21.
72. Kitok, Communication No. 197/1985, CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988), 4.3.
73. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 11 (Oct. 16).
74. Benjamin Ederington, Property as a Natural Institution: The Separation of Property from
Sovereignty in International Law, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 263, 263 (1997).
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Acastus submits that where territory is acquired by a state in this fashion,
customary international law confers special rights on those indigenous people.
These special rights qualify the sovereignty rights of the state. These rights,
characterized broadly as "self-determination rights," include, inter alia, special
property interests in land and natural resources. This right need not be the
absolute form of property rights observable in many municipal law regimes."
This right could, in the instant case, be discharged in a number of ways ranging
from consultation and profit sharing to a rerouting of the pipeline.
This practice by states is evidenced in many international treaties. Article
15 of the ILO Convention No. 169, to which it is likely that Rubria is a party,
requires that: "The rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources
pertaining to their lands shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the
right of these peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation
of these resources." (Emphasis added).76 Article 1(1) of the ICCPR (which is
identical to Article 1 of the ICESCR) states that: "All peoples have the right
of self-determination."77 This statement is further elaborated upon in Article
1(2): "All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth."78 Article 7 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples states that: "Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual
right not to... prevention of and redress for: ... (b) any action which has the
aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources."79
This right is further developed in Articles 26-28 of the Draft Declaration.8"
Acastus submits that a sense of obligation amongst state actors that they
are bound by customary norm to safeguard these rights is evident amongst those
states in which indigenous people reside or subsist. The following are
examples of such opinio juris: the High Court of Australia in Mabo v.
Queensland [No. 2] overturned the long-held presumption at common law that
Australia had been terra nullius at the time of its occupation due to the
"backwards" nature of its aboriginal inhabitants.81 The High Court of Australia
granted "native title" to the applicant, an indigenous Aboriginal, and in doing
75. See generally Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co., 2 A.C. 883 (2002).
76. The International Labor Organization Convention (No. 169) Concerning the Protection of
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382, at art. 15 (entered
into force Sept. 5, 1991).
77. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 1(1).
78. Id. at art. 1(2).
79. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-
Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, art. 7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add I (Apr. 20, 1994).
80. Id. at arts. 26-28.
81. Mabo v. Queensland H, (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
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so recognized that indigenous heritage gives rise to certain property rights at
law, including the right to access the land and practice traditional agriculture
thereon, as well as the right to exclude other uses of the land such as mining or
urban development.8 2 In the Awas Tingni case, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights injuncted the government of Nicaragua from licensing a Korean
corporation to log communal lands of the Mayagna people. 3 In a decision
followed by that tribunal in several subsequent cases, the Inter-American Court
recognized Indigenous property rights as arising from Article 21 of the
American Convention on Human Rights and pledged to protect them. 4 The
Canadian Government has also recognized these rights "through the Indian Act
of 1970 and Treaty 8 of 21 June 1899 (concerning aboriginal land rights in
northern Alberta)." 5  This treaty is now enshrined in the Canadian
Constitution. 6 New Zealand has protected similar land rights through the
Maori Land Act of 1993 and the Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975.87 Chapter 12
of South Africa's Constitution protects the rights of indigenous inhabitants,
including the customary law of indigenous peoples as it applies to land. 8
Acastus submits that the effect of this customary norm in the instant case
is that it restricts the right of Rubria to dispose of the land constituting Elysian
Fields and the natural resources thereupon. Without considering full extent of
this restriction, it is submitted that Rubria's right to grant licenses of an
exclusive character over the entire lands of the Elysian Fields to COG without
consulting or seeking approval from the Elysians must fall within such a
restriction, as it gives no account at all to the self-determination rights of the
Elysians. It is submitted, therefore, that national sovereignty rights cannot form
the basis of a defense at international law for Rubria's inactions.
82. Id.
83. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Court H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 79 (Judgment on merits and reparations of Aug. 31, 2001), in 19 ARmz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 395 (2002)
(pub. abridged ver.) [hereinafter Awas Tingni case].
84. See S. James Anaya, Divergent Discourses about International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist Trend, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y
237, 239 (2005); Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, doc. 5 rev. I at
860(2002); Maya Indigenous Communities ofthe Toledo District, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 40/04, 61 (2004).
85. Ominayak, Commc'n No. 167/1984, CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990), 2.3; see also
Delgamuukwv. British Columbia, 3 S.C.R. 1010, 206 (1997); see generally R. v. Marshall, 3 S.C.R. 456
(1999) (citing R. v. Badger, I S.C.R. 771, 79 (1996)).
86. Canada Constitution.
87. Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975; Maori Land Act, 1993.
88. South Africa Constitution, ch. 12.
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C. The Activities of Prof in the Elysium, Including the Forced Labor of
Civilians, are Violations of International Law and are Attributable to
Rubria.
1. The Activities of PROF in the Elysium, Including Forced Labor, Are
Violations of International Law.
Article 9(1) of the ICCPR states, inter alia, that "everyone has the right to
liberty and security of person.89 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention." By kidnapping and detaining the Elysian laborers, PROF violated
the Elysians' right to liberty and security of the person.
Article 8(3) of ICCPR provides that no one shall be required to perform
forced or compulsory labor.9" ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work requires member states to eliminate all forms of forced and
compulsory labor.91 By forcing the Elysian labourers to work on the pipeline
project against their will, the conduct of PROF fell afoul of the interests
protected by ICCPR Article 8(3) and the ILO Declaration.
PROF is also in breach of international custom which similarly prohibits
forced labor. The existence of such a custom is evidenced in Article 23(1) of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,92 Article 4 of the European
Convention on Human Rights,9 3 Article 6(2) of the American Convention on
Human Rights, 94 Article 1 of the ILO Forced Labor Convention,95 Article 1 of
the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention,96 and various resolutions of the U.N.
General Assembly.97
Furthermore, the Elysian laborers were forced to work all day on the
pipeline project and they were only given a small bag of sorghum as payment
89. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 9(1).
90. Id. at art. 8(3)(a).
91. International Labor Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
1998, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATION WEB.ABOUTDECLARATIONHOME
?var-language=EN (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
92. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
93. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force
Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec.
20, 1971, Jan. 1, 1990, and Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
94. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S., 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic3.htm (last visited Sept. 26,
2006).
95. Forced Labour Convention, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55.
96. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
97. G.A. Res. 52/140, 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/140 (Dec. 12, 1997); G.A. Res. 53/162, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/53/162 (Feb. 25, 1999); G.A. Res. 56/231, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/231 (Feb. 28, 2002).
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for their labor. Their rights are violated under Article 7 of ICSECR, which
protects a person's right to fair and just remuneration for work.98
The Elysian economy is insular and wholly agricultural. According to
Elysian tradition, children, pregnant women, and the physically and mentally
handicapped do not labor in their fields. As the Elysian men were forced to
work on the pipeline during the daytime and only allowed to return to their
fields in the evening, the Elysians were deprived of their own means of
subsistence, contrary to Article 1 of the ICSECR.99
2. COG is Liable for PROF's Activities.
Pursuant to a contract concluded in July 2004, PROF was engaged by
COG to carry out various operations in the Elysium in return for a fee which
covered operating costs and profits.'00 Although PROF has a separate corporate
identity from COG, it was created and financed by COG solely for the purpose
of carrying out the COG contract. PROF was empowered by COG to determine
and purchase the weapons and ammunitions necessary for its operations.10
More importantly, PROF was authorized by COG to practice forced labor, as
evidenced by the fact that the Elysians were deposited at sites to work under the
instructions of COG managers. Therefore, PROF is an empowered agent of
COG.
It is submitted that private security companies are capable of violating
human rights if armed violence is used to kill, detain, kidnap or otherwise
coerce.10 2  Companies that use such private security firms are clearly
responsible for the conduct of their agents.' 3 It is not disputed that PROF used
force or threatened to use force in kidnapping and coercing the Elysians to work
on the pipeline project. COG is therefore responsible for the conduct of PROF.
98. ICESCR, supra note 66, art. 7.
99. Id. at art. 1.
100. Compromis, 23.
101. Id.
102. Compromis, 30.
103. Social and Economic Rights Action Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria,
Commc'n No. 155/96 (2001); Fifteenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, 2001-2002, 50, 58, 62; Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War;
Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Order, 34 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 75, 152-53 (1998).
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3. The Activities of PROF in the Elysium Are Attributable to Rubria.
Conduct attributable to the state can consist of actions or omissions.
104
The activities of PROF are attributable to Rubria due to its interest in and
control of COG and/or its omission to take appropriate measures to secure the
rights of the Elysians.
a. Rubria is Directly Responsible for PROF's Conduct Due to its
Interest in and Control of COG.
In the case of corporate entities, international law recognizes the
separateness of corporate entities at the national level, except in those cases
where the "corporate veil" is a mere device or a vehicle for fraud or evasion.'0 5
The conduct of corporate entities in carrying out their activities is prima facie
not attributable to the state.0 6 However, where there is evidence that the state
is using its interest in or control of a corporation in order to achieve a particular
result, the conduct in question can be attributed to the state.
0 7
In the Foremost Tehran v. Iran case, a decision not to pay dividends to the
company's shareholders, including the claimant American company, was
attributable to the Iranian State."' The Iran-US Claims Tribunal based its
decision on the fact that the State of Iran was represented on the company's
board of directors and these representatives had influenced the board of
directors' meeting at which the decision was taken for the purpose of
expropriating shareholders.0 9
A state is also responsible for the acts of non-state entities if the private
conduct is directed or controlled by the state." 0 The non-state entities are not
state organs and the conduct does not have to involve "governmental
authority.""'.
104. International Law Commission, Commentaries to the DraftArticles on Responsibility ofStates
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 70 U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess. (2001) [hereinafter Commentaries to Draft
Articles].
105. Id. at 107.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 108.
108. Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 228 (1986).
109. Ademola Abass, Consent Precluding State Responsibility: A Critical Analysis, 55 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 211 (2004).
110. International Law Commission, Draft Articles of the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, UN GAOR, 56th Session, Supp. No. 10, Article 8, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter
Draft Articles].
11. JAGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY 140
(2002).
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In the Case concerning Military andParamilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, this Court accepted that a state can be liable for humanitarian
violations committed by non-state actors outside its territory.' 2 It was held that
for the conduct of non-state actors to give rise to legal responsibility of the
state, it would have to be proved that the state had effective control of the non-
state actor's operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed." 3
The issue in the present case is whether Rubria used its interest and control
of COG for a particular purpose and whether such control was effective. The
Rubrian government and TNC incorporated COG expressly and solely for the
purpose of developing and exporting the petroleum resources in the south of the
Elysium." 4 This is in concert with Rubria's post-independence policy to
encourage investment by multinational companies, especially those involved in
extracting mineral and oil resources. Clearly, Rubria would like to use its
interest in COG as a vehicle to advance its local economy, despite its
knowledge that the operation of COG would jeopardize the livelihood and
rights of the Elysians.
Rubria may contend that its government is only the minority shareholder
of COG and hence it did not have effective control of the latter's decision.
However, it is submitted that a majority shareholding is not a prerequisite to
effective control over a corporate entity. In the case of private corporations,
effective control can flow from the economic, legal and political connection
between the corporation and the state." 5 In this case, it can be established that
Rubria had effective control over the activities of COG and PROF by way of
the following facts:
A) Rubria is responsible for almost half (forty-nine percent) of the
funding for COG;" 6
B) COG was incorporated under the laws of Rubria;" 7
C) The agricultural lands to be exploited for oil are under the
stewardship of the National Parks Authority ("NPA"), an
agency of the Rubrian government;"' and
112. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 63, 111.
113. Id. 1112.
114. Compromis, 19.
115. 115. JAGERS, supra note I 11, at 171; Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights:
A Theory of Legal Responsibility, I II YALE L.J. 443, 525 (2001).
116. Compromis, 19.
117. Id.
118. Id. 5.
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D) The Rubrian government granted COG the exclusive rights to
operate within the region to COG." 9
Hence, Rubria had effective control over COG and is directly responsible
for the human rights violations by PFOF, which acted as COG's agent.
b. Rubria has Failed to Take Reasonable and Appropriate Measures to
Secure the Elysians' Rights.
i. States have an Implied Duty to Regulate Activities of Private Entities to
Avoid Human Rights Violations.
Rubria is a party to the ICCPR, ICSECR, and the ILO. 20 These conven-
tions impose an obligation on the party states' governments to regulate the
conduct of multi-national corporations within their jurisdiction in order to
uphold the principles contained within them.1 2'
This general obligation can also be found in international human rights law
and it has appeared in the case-law of international human rights bodies. For
example, the Inter-American Court in the Velasquez-Rodriguez case decided
that Honduras was responsible, even if the alleged human rights violations had
not been carried out by agents acting under the cover of public authority. 22
This was because the state failed to prevent these violations or to punish those
responsible. 12
In the Diplomatic and Consular Staff case, this Court concluded that the
responsibility of Iran was entailed by the "inaction" of its authorities which
"failed to take appropriate steps," in circumstances where such steps were
evidently called for. 124
Similarly, in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre for Economic and
Social Rights v. Nigeria, the African Commission of Human and People's
Rights held that Nigeria failed to discharge its duty to protect citizens from
damaging acts done by private parties by failing to enact appropriate legislation
and institute effective enforcement measures against breaches, contrary to the
119. Id. 20.
120. Id. 36.
121. Daniel Aguirre, Multinational Corporations and the Realisation of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 53, 66 (2004); Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights paras. 6, 7 & 18 (Jan. 22-26, 1997), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines-.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
122. . Velasquez-Rodriguez case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, 182 (1988).
123. Id. 178.
124. United Nations Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 31-32
(May 24).
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minimum conduct expected of governments and therefore, it acted contrary to
the African Charter on Human and People's Rights.'25
In the present case, Rubria failed to discharge its duty to prevent the illegal
activities of PROF, including forced labor, which took place within Rubrian
territory. When entering into the bilateral agreement with Acastus, RABBIT,
Rubria specifically insisted on having the corporate responsibility provision of
the MCRA incorporated to ensure that human rights would be observed by
Acastian corporations. 2 6 Rubria, however, failed to satisfy the minimum
requirement of enacting similar legislation on its part.'27
ii. Actual Knowledge of the Violations is not
Required to Constitute Breach.
It has been argued that the simple fact of harm by a corporation, where a
government does not have adequate prior or concurrent knowledge of that harm,
cannot trigger state responsibility.12 Thus, Rubria may contend that it was not
aware of PROF's conduct, including forced labor, at the time the conduct was
occurring.
However, the findings of the ILSA report, including the incidents of forced
labor committed by PROF, were published in September 2004 .29 It is
submitted that Rubria had at least constructive knowledge of PROF's conduct.
Furthermore, the agricultural lands cultivated by the Elysians are under the
stewardship of the NPA, an agency of the Rubrian government. 30 Additionally,
Rubria had appointed four directors of COG, to whom the chief executive
officer of COG reported.'3 ' Even if the Rubrian government did not have actual
knowledge of PROF's conduct, its knowledge can be imputed through the NPA
and its interest and control of COG.
In the Corfu Channel case, this Court found Albania liable for a failure to
act when it knew or should have known of the illegal conduct taking place
within its territory.132
125. 15th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, supra
note 103.
126. Compromis, 15.
127. Aguirre, supra note 121, at para. 150).
128. Craig Scott, Multinational Enterprises and Emergent Jurisprudence on Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 563-96 (A. Eide, C.
Krause & A. Rosas eds., 2d ed. 2001).
129. Compromis, 24.
130. Id. 5.
131. See generally Id.
132. Corfu Channel case, (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,4, 23.
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Rubria was the situs of PROF's activities which violated the Elysians'
human rights.'3 3 Rubria ought to have known of the illegal conduct and its
failure to prevent or penalize such activities gave rise to a breach of its
obligations under ICCPR, ICSECR, ILO, and customary international law.
iii. Serious Harm has Been Caused to the Elysians.
In the Ldnsman cases, the UNHRC required a threshold of seriousness of
harm before a state's duties to prevent the harm were triggered, and, even then,
a state may discharge such duties by fulfilling its obligation to consult with the
potentially affected groups.'34 This duty to consult and negotiate in good faith
was confirmed by this Court in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project.' The UNHRC decided that Finland had not violated its legal
obligations, noting that the amount of quarrying that had already taken place
had not caused significant harm.'36 It also noted that the authors of the
complaint had been consulted before the quarrying permit was issued. "
The present case can be distinguished from the Ldnsman cases in that the
Elysians were never consulted on the building of the oil pipeline. Hence,
Rubria is in breach of its duty of good faith. Serious harm has been caused to
the Elysians due to the forced labor, the lack of adequate compensation, and the
deprivation of opportunities to cultivate their agricultural lands during daytime.
D. The Outcome of the Borius Litigation Does Not Place Acastus in Breach
of Article 52 of the RABBIT.
It is submitted that the Acastian court acted lawfully in dismissing TNC
as a defendant in the claims under AIRES and the MCRA, and hence Acastus
is not in breach of Article 52 of the RABBIT. 3 8
1. TNC Is Not Liable for the Conduct of PROF under AIRES Since It Is Not
a Subject of International Law.
a. The Nature of Claims under AIRES.
Under AIRES, Acastian courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases
in which it is claimed that international law, including but not limited to the
133. Compromis, 30.
134. Commc'n No. 511/1992, CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, 8.4.
135. Case Concerning the Gabcik ovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 3, 7.
136. Commc'n No. 511/1992, CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, M 9.6, 10.
137. Id. 9.6.
138. Compromis, 15.
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international law of human rights, has been violated outside the national
territory, so long as the defendant is present or may be found in Acastus. '39
.As found by the domestic court of Acastus, TNC, as a private company,
is not a "subject" of international law, which governs the rights of statesand
other international legal persons, and therefore is not a proper party defendant
in a case under AIRES.
140
b. TNC is Not a Subject of International Law.
To determine the obligations of corporations for human rights violations
under international law, the status of corporations under international law must
be first addressed.1 4' Under present international law, entities only owe
responsibilities to the international community when they are considered to be
subjects of international law. 142
A subject of the law is an entity capable of possessing international rights
and duties and having the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing
international claims. 43 The question then turns onto whether a corporation has
i) rights, ii) duties, and iii) whether it is able to enforce its rights in international
law.
In terms of international rights, it has been accepted that business
enterprises have rights under international law, whether the economic right
under investment treaties to receive nondiscriminatory treatment, or political
rights such as freedom of speech.'" As for the ability of a corporation to
enforce its rights, there is also evidence that corporations have been provided
with the possibility of enforcing their rights through arbitration. Other
examples include the United Nations Compensation Commission, through
which corporations can bring claims for compensation against Iraq,'45 and the
Seabed Disputes Chamber, 146 which has jurisdiction relating to disputes
between parties to a contract.
However, in terms of duties, the classic position is that the primary rules
of international law are addressed to states and state officials, not non-state
139. Id. 27.
140. Id. 28.
141. JAGERS, supra note I11,at 19.
142. Jdgers, Multinational Corporation underinternational Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARD AND
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORP., THE HAGUE 259, 261 (1999).
143. Reparation for Injuries in the Service of the UN case, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179.
144. Addo, The Corporation as a Victim ofHuman Rights Violations, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARD
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORP., THE HAGUE 187, 191 (1999).
145. SC Res. 692, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (May 20, 1991).
146. Annex V1 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
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actors.'47 The most commonly cited example of international legal norms
imposing obligations on corporations is the European concept of Drittwirkung,
under which certain provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights
are understood to contemplate "horizontal effect," meaning that they apply as
between private parties.'48 However, it is submitted that such a concept does
not conflict with the classic position, as European authorities have demon-
strated that it is the state that has the obligation to ensure that private parties
behave in certain ways towards other private parties.'
Similarly, in Velasquez-Rodriguez, although the Inter-American Court
recognized that the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights had a
horizontal effect similar to that of the European Convention, it affirmed the
responsibility of the state for its failure to prevent or punish private conduct that
infringed human rights, but it did not hold that private individuals who inflict
such injuries are guilty of violating the Convention. 5 0
Therefore, although corporations have rights and are sometimes able to
enforce their rights by bringing international claims, there is no binding
agreement that directly imposes international obligations or duties on
corporations. Therefore, TNC, as a corporation, is not a subject of international
law and is not a proper party defendant in the claim under AIRES.
c. Furthermore, TNC is Not Bound by Any "Soft Law" Which Seeks to
Impose International Obligations Directly on Corporations.
While the U.N. Global Compact,' 5' ILO Tripartite Declaration of
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,'52 and the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ("the OECD Guidelines")'53
all urge toward some form of legal personality, they are not clear or precise
enough to establish on their own a customary rule on international legal
147. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 58.
148. Jiigers, supra note 142, at 265.
149. L6pez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277 (1994); Guerra v. Italy, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 357 (1998);
see also Carlos M. Vk.zquez, Direct vs Indirect Obligations of Corporations under International Law, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 928, 937 (2005).
150. Velasquez-Rodriguez case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988).
151. UN Global Compact, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/global.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2006).
152. ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/mne.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
153. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Text, Commentary and Clarifications,
DAFFIME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL, available at http//www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/LinkTo/daffe-ime-
wpg(2000)15-final (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
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personality for corporations.'54 They are essentially "soft law," i.e., they are
only voluntary in nature and they do not on their own impose any binding
obligations on corporations.'
Rubria may seek to rely on Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
("Norms"), which aspire to hold businesses accountable for their human rights
abuses. 56 However, although the Norms are not voluntary, they are still in the
form of recommendations and have not attained the status of a treaty which
would create legally binding obligations on private corporations.'57
In any event, the very first principles of the Norms, entitled "General
Obligations," state that the Norms are in no manner intended to reduce the
obligations of governments to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure
respect for, or protect human rights.'58 The Norms would be misused if they
were employed by a government to justify failing to protect human rights fully
or to provide appropriate remedies for human rights violations. This idea is
reinforced in paragraph 19 of the Norms, which provides that nothing in the
Norms should be construed as diminishing states' obligations to protect and
promote human rights or as limiting rules or laws that provide greater
protection of human rights.'59
Hence, even under the Norms, Rubria is still obliged to ensure that human
rights are being protected within its territory and there is no justification for
shifting its liability to TNC or any other corporate entities.
2. TNC Is Not a Proper Party Defendant within the Meaning of the MCRA.
a. TNC had No Direct Involvement in PROF's Activities in the Elysium.
According to section 1 of the MCRA, the purposes of the Act are to, inter
alia, ensure that business entities incorporated in Acastus conduct themselves
abroad by the same standards to which they are held in their domestic affairs. 60
154. llias Bantekas, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309,
314 (2004).
155. David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 913
(2003).
156. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR C.H.R., 55th Session, 22nd mtg., UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub/2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter Norms].
157. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 155, at 914.
158. Norms, supra note 156.
159. Id. 19.
160. Compromis, Annex A(1).
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This provision limits the jurisdiction of the Acastian civil courts to claims
against business entities which carry out operations outside the territory of
Acastus. In fact, the words "conduct abroad" or "operating abroad" appear five
times in the entire Act. They demonstrate that the Act only applies to
corporations which actively conduct their businesses outside the Acastian
territory. Therefore, using either a purposive or literal interpretation of the Act,
liability under the Act can only be imposed on corporations which are directly
involved in activities that violate customary international law.
In the present case, TNC did not have any direct involvement in the
alleged activities of PROF. Rather, it was COG that operated the pipeline
project in the Elysium and engaged PROF to commit various violations against
the Elysians, including forced labor. As there is also no evidence that TNC was
the alter ego of COG, TNC should not be named as a defendant within the
meaning of the MCRA.
b. The MCRA does not Repeal the Principle of Limited Liability Despite
the Incorporation of the OECD Guidelines.
The MCRA has expressly incorporated the General Policies set out in the
OECD Guidelines for interpreting and implementing the standards of the Act.16 '
Rubria may argue that TNC, as a parent company, is responsible for PROF's
conduct, since under the OECD Guidelines, parent companies are responsible
to ensure that their subsidiaries observe the Guidelines. '62 However, it must be
emphasized that such obligation was mentioned only in the clarifications of the
Concepts and Principles of the Guidelines. Nowhere in the General Policies,
to which the MCRA specifically refers, including the corresponding official
commentary and clarification, is such an obligation stipulated.
In any event, the clarifications under Concepts and Principles confirm that
the Guidelines are not meant to supersede or substitute for national laws
governing corporate liability and they do not imply an unqualified principle of
parent company responsibility.'63 Therefore, the Acastian court, in interpreting
the MCRA, had the discretion to adopt the principle of limited liability and
acknowledge the existence of a corporate veil protecting TNC from being held
liable for the conduct of its subsidiaries. Such discretion has been well
recognized by the European Court of Human Rights under the margin of
appreciation doctrine. The doctrine suggests that insofar as the standard for a
protected right is satisfied, states are allowed a wide discretion when choosing
161. Id. at A(3).
162. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, supra note 153, at 9.
163. Id. at 10.
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the means of enforcing international law and assessing its impact on their
citizens."6
c. Examples From Other States Demonstrate a Similar Approach to
Assessing Liability of Parent Companies.
In order to decide whether the Acastian court was correct in adopting the
limited liability approach in the Borius litigation, it would be useful to consider
other national courts' decisions on similar matters. In Australia, a 1998 court
judgment refused to hold an Australian parent company, James Hardie, liable
for asbestosis suffered by an employee at its New Zealand subsidiary, on the
basis that the parent's legal identity prevented the imposition of a duty of care
under the law of negligence.' 65 It also noted that "the law pays scant regard to
the commercial reality that every holding company has the potential [to] and,
more often than not, in fact, does, exercise complete control over the
subsidiary."' 66
Another useful reference can be made to the Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA") of the United States. Similar to the MCRA, the ATCA gives U.S.
district courts power to hear civil claims by foreign citizens for injuries caused
by actions "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' 67
In Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., ;B218;B218the U.S. court decided that
whether to hold a parent company liable for the acts of its subsidiary is a fact-
based inquiry, and the general rule is to respect the corporate form, unless to do
so would work an injustice upon innocent third parties.'68 The court rejected
the plaintiffs alter-ego theory because there was "no evidence to support a
finding that incorporation was undertaken in bad faith or that observing the
corporate form would achieve an inequitable result.;B219;B219" 6 9
Rubria may seek to rely on another ATCA case, National Coalition
Government ofBurman v. Unocal Inc., in which a U.S. district court held that
a corporation could be held liable for its overseas joint venture's violations of
international human rights. 7 ' However, such a decision has been criticized as
164. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUR. CT. H.R. 17 (2002).
165. Briggs v. James Hardie & Co. Pty. Ltd. 16 NSWLR 549 (1989).
166. Id. at 577.
167. Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/atcaindx.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
168. Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
169. Id. at 1247.
170. Nat'l Coal. Gov't of Union of Burma v. Unocal Inc., 176 FRD 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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a misapplication of international law and discouraging to foreign investments
in countries with poor human rights records. 7'
d. No Injustice Has Been Caused by Dismissing TNC as a Defendant.
Rubria may contend that if Rubria is liable for COG's business operations
in the Elysium, by the same token TNC should also be liable because of its
controlling interest in COG. Otherwise, TNC would be receiving preferential
treatment.
However, it should be noted that the Acastian court's decision against
Rubria is based on the provisions of AIRES, not the MCRA. More importantly,
the decision is not premised on the fact that it was a shareholder of COG, but
as a violator of the Elysians' internationally-guaranteed human rights. As
suggested by the above-mentioned Australian case Briggs, a controlling interest
does not automatically impose liability on the parent company for the wrongful
acts conducted by the subsidiary.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the court's decision has caused any
injustice upon the plaintiffs or any innocent third parties, nor is there any
indication that COG was created for fraudulent purposes by TNC to evade any
existing or potential liabilities.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons in this Memorial, the Republic of Acastus
respectfully requests that this honourable Court:
i) DECLARE that this Court has jurisdiction over all claims in
this case since Acastus has succeeded to Nessus's status as a
party to the Statute of the Court;
ii) DECLARE that Rubria violated the rights of Acastus's citizens
of Elysian heritage;
iii) DECLARE that the activities of PROF in the Elysium,
including the forced labor of civilians, are attributable to Rubria
and are violations of international law;
iv) DECLARE that the outcome of the Borius litigation does not
place Acastus in breach of Article 52 of the RABBIT.
171. Pia Zara Thadhani, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Is Unocal the Answer, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 619 (2000); David I. Becker, A Callfor the Codification of the Unocal Doctrine, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 183, 206 (1998).
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